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ABSTRACT
A common challenge in distributed work systems like P2P
ﬁle-sharing communities, or ad-hoc routing networks, is to
minimize the number of free-riders and incentivize contri-
butions. Without any centralized monitoring it is diﬃcult
to distinguish contributors from free-riders. One way to ad-
dress this problem is via accounting mechanisms which rely
on voluntary reports by individual agents and compute a
score for each agent in the network. In Seuken et al. [11],
we have recently proposed a mechanism which removes any
incentive for a user to manipulate the mechanism via misre-
ports. However, we left the existence of sybil-proof account-
ing mechanisms as an open question. In this paper, we set-
tle this question, and show the striking impossibility result
that under reasonable assumptions no sybil-proof account-
ing mechanism exists. We show, that a signiﬁcantly weaker
form of K-sybil-proofness can be achieved against certain
classes of sybil attacks. Finally, we explain how limited ro-
bustness to sybil manipulations can be achieved by using
max-ﬂow algorithms in accounting mechanism design.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sci-
ences—Economics
General Terms
Algorithms, Design, Economics
Keywords
Mechanism Design, Sybil-Proofness, P2P, Reputation
1. INTRODUCTION
Distributed work systems arise in many places, for exam-
ple in peer-to-peer (P2P) ﬁle-sharing networks, or in ad-hoc
wireless networks where individual peers route data pack-
ages for each other. Of course, the total amount of work
performed by a population is equal to the total amount of
work consumed. Moreover, while some degree of free-riding
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may be acceptable, the long-term viability of distributed
work systems relies on roughly balanced work contributions.
Otherwise, strategic agents may seek to free-ride on the sys-
tem, i.e., minimize the work they perform and maximize
the work they consume. This problem becomes particularly
challenging when the interactions are bilateral, there is no a
priori trust relation between the agents, there is no ability to
monitor activities, no contract covers the interactions, and
no currency can be used because the institutional require-
ments for payment exchanges are not available.
In Seuken et al. [11], we have recently formalized this
problem and introduced accounting mechanisms that pro-
vide a solution: they keep long-term tallies of work per-
formed and consumed and compute a score that approx-
imates an agent’s net contributions. Because accounting
mechanisms rely on voluntary reports, a major challenge is
to provide robustness against strategic manipulations. The
two manipulations we consider are misreports, where an
agent overstates the amount of work contributed or con-
sumed, and sybil manipulations, where an agent creates fake
copies of itself. Previously, we have proposed the Drop-Edge
mechanism which selectively ignores some of the reports,
thereby providing misreport-proofness [11]. However, we
have left open the question whether sybilproof accounting
mechanism exist. In this paper, we prove that under rea-
sonable assumptions, no sybilproof accounting mechanism
exists. We show that a signiﬁcantly weaker form of robust-
ness can be achieved for a restricted class of attacks. Finally,
we discuss the usefulness of max-ﬂow algorithms for limited
robustness against sybil manipulations in practice.
Accounting vs. Reputation Mechanisms.
Misreport and sybil manipulations are well-studied in the
related literature on trust and reputation mechanisms [6].
However, the results from this literature do not translate
to accounting mechanisms. First, in distributed work sys-
tems, every positive report by A about his interaction with
B, i.e., B performed work for A, is simultaneously a neg-
ative report about A, i.e., A received work from B. This
fundamental tension is not present in reputation mecha-
nisms. Second, sybil manipulations are much more pow-
erful against accounting mechanisms. For a search engine,
for example, the primary concern is that an agent could
increase the reputation of its website by creating a set of
sybils that are linking to the original website, but an agent
does not care about the reputation of the sybils themselves.
In a distributed work system, in contrast, if an agent can
create sybils with a positive score, then these sybils may
receive work from other users without negatively aﬀectingi j i
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Figure 1: A subjective work graph from agent i's
perspective. Edges where i has direct information
have only one weight. Other edges can have two
weights, corresponding to the possibly conicting
reports of the two agents involved.
the score of the original agent. While various reputation
mechanisms have been proposed that are sybil-proof (e.g.,
maxﬂow, hitting-time [2, 12]), these results do not trans-
late to accounting mechanisms. Third, once an agent has
a high reputation it can beneﬁt from that for a long time.
For example, a website with a high PageRank [8] beneﬁts
from lots of visitors without aﬀecting its reputation. In dis-
tributed work systems, in contrast, an agent beneﬁts from
a high score by getting priority for receiving work in the
future, which in turn decreases its score again. Thus, ac-
counting scores are inherently temporary.
Related Work.
Despite the diﬀerences between accounting and reputation
mechanisms, the literature on transitive trust and reputa-
tion mechanisms [6] is an important precursor to our own
work. One of the largest steps forward regarding robust
incentives in a real-world P2P system was the BitTorrent
protocol [3]. In contrast to previous protocols like Napster
or Gnutella, BitTorrent uses a policy with short-term, direct
incentives, resembling to a large degree a simple tit-for-tat
mechanism. Feldman et al. [4, 5] study the challenges in-
volved in providing robust incentives in fully decentralized
P2P networks. However, they do not propose a misreport-
proof mechanism. Piatek et al. [9] ﬁnd empirically that
most users of P2P ﬁle-sharing networks are connected via
a one hop link in the connection graph and motivate the
use of well-connected intermediaries to broker information.
Along similar lines, Meulpolder et al. [7] present a fully
decentralized accounting mechanism, but without a formal
analysis of its properties. Cheng et al. [1, 2] have studied
the sybil-proofness of reputation mechanisms. While their
work inﬂuenced our thinking about sybil-proofness, unfortu-
nately, their results do not translate to our domain, due to
the diﬀerences between accounting and reputation mecha-
nisms. Resnick and Sami [10] also study the sybil-proofness
problem. However, in their model, individual transactions
are risky and can have positive or negative outcomes. In con-
trast, in our domain, individual transactions are not risky.
Instead, our focus is on computing accounting scores that
are proportional to the net work contributed by the agents.
2. FORMAL MODEL
Consider a distributed work system of n agents each ca-
pable of doing work for each other. All work is assumed to
be quantiﬁable in the same units. The work performed by
all agents is captured by a work graph:
Denition 1. (Work Graph) A work graph G =
(V;E;w) has vertices V = {1;:::;n}, one for each agent,
and directed edges (i;j) ∈ E, for i;j ∈ V , corresponding
to work performed by i for j, with weight w(i;j) ∈ R≥0
denoting the number of units of work.
Figure 2: Accounting Mechanism and Allocation
Policy.
We use e ∈ E when referring to a generic edge, and (i;j) ∈
E when referring to the speciﬁc edge from i to j. The true
work graph may be unknown to individual agents who only
have direct information about their own participation:
Denition 2. (Agent Information) Each agent i ∈ V
keeps a private history (wi(i;j);wi(j;i)) of its interactions
with other agents j ∈ V , where wi(i;j) and wi(j;i) are the
work performed for j and received from j respectively.
Based on its own experiences and known reports from
other agents, agent i can construct a subjective work graph
(see Figure 1). Let w
j
i(j;k);w
k
i (j;k) ∈ R≥0 denote the edge
weight as reported by agent j and agent k respectively.
Denition 3. (Subjective Work Graph) A subjective
work graph from agent i’s perspective, Gi = (Vi;Ei;wi),
is a set of vertices Vi ⊆ V and directed edges Ei. Each
edge (j;k) ∈ Ei for which i = ∈ {j;k}, is labeled with one, or
both, of weights w
j
i(j;k);w
k
i (j;k) as known to i. For edges
(i;j) and (j;i) the associated weight is w
i
i(i;j) = w(i;j) and
w
i
i(j;i) = w(j;i) respectively.
We assume that these weights are shared through volun-
tary reports to a central server, while still maintaining the
core assumption of no central monitoring and no indepen-
dent veriﬁcation of reports. Thus, the edge weights w
j
i(j;k)
and w
k
i (j;k) need not be truthful reports about w(j;k).
In earlier work we also considered a decentralized protocol,
with bilateral sharing of information with other agents [11].
Periodically, an agent can receive a work request by a set
of agents with which the agent may have rarely or never
interacted with before. This induces a choice set:
Denition 4. (Choice Set) We let Ci ⊆ V \ {i} denote
the choice set for agent i, i.e., the set of agents that are
currently interested in receiving some work from i.
An accounting mechanism computes a score for each agent
j ∈ Ci, proportional to the net work contributed.
Denition 5. (Accounting Mechanism) An account-
ing mechanism M takes as input a subjective work graph Gi,
a choice set Ci, and determines the score S
M
j (Gi;Ci) ∈ R,
for any agent j ∈ Ci, as viewed by agent i.
We let S
M
0 denote the default score that accounting mech-
anism M assigns to an agent about which no information
regarding work consumed or performed is available (i.e., the
two agents are disconnected in the subjective work graph).
Once the accounting mechanism has computed a score for
each agent in the choice set, an agent needs an allocation pol-
icy (e.g.,“winner-takes-all”or“threshold rules”) to decide to
whom to allocate work to (see Figure 2).
Denition 6. (Allocation Policy) Given a choice set Ci
and accounting scores S
M
j for each agent j ∈ Ci, an alloca-
tion policy A(Ci;S
M) selects one agent j
∗ ∈ Ci for whom
agent i shall perform one unit of work.Figure 3: A strongly benecial sybil attack.
3. STRATEGIC MANIPULATIONS
We assume an agent population that consists of coopera-
tive agents who contribute approximately as much as they
consume work, and free-riders who contribute less than they
consume. Accounting mechanisms help agents diﬀerentiate
between cooperative agents and free-riders, in such a way
that the performance increases for cooperative agents and
decreases for free-riders. For a well functioning accounting
mechanism we need to remove advantages from strategic ma-
nipulations. The ﬁrst class of manipulations we consider are
misreports [11], where an agent reports false information
about its work performed or consumed:
Denition 7. (Misreport-proof) An accounting mech-
anism M is misreport-proof if, for any subjective work graph
Gi, any choice set Ci, any agent j ∈ Ci, for every misreport
manipulation by j, where G
′
i is the subjective work graph
induced by the misreports, the following holds:
• S
M
j (G
′
i;Ci) ≤ S
M
j (Gi;Ci), and
• S
M
k (G
′
i;Ci) ≥ S
M
k (Gi;Ci) ∀k ∈ Ci \ {j}.
In words, we consider a mechanism to be misreport-
proof if reporting false work information can only worsen
an agent’s own score and improve the score of other agents.
The second class of manipulations we consider are sybil
manipulations, where an agent introduces sybils (fake
agents) into the network to manipulate the accounting mech-
anism. Given subjective work graph Gi, an attacking agent
can do multiple things, e.g., add sybils to the network, or
make multiple false reports. We model this as happening in
one step, inducing a new subjective work graph G
′
i.
Denition 8. (Passive Sybil Attack) A passive sybil
attack by agent j is a tuple j = (Vs;Es;ws) where Vs =
{sj1;sj2;:::} is a set of sybils, Es = {(x;y) : x;y ∈ S ∪
{j}}, and ws are the edge weights for the edges in Es (one
weight per edge). Applying the sybil attack j to agent i’s
subjective work graph Gi = (Vi;Ei;wi) results in a modiﬁed
subjective work graph Gi↓j = G
′
i = (Vi ∪ Vs;Ei ∪ Es;w
′)
where w
′(e) = wi(e) for e ∈ Ei and w
′(e) = ws(e) for e ∈ Es.
This attack is called passive, because the sybils themselves
do not perform work. Attacks where some of the sybils also
perform work, possibly over multiple time steps, are called
active sybil attacks. The following deﬁnitions are pur-
posefully written to be agnostic to the behavior of other
agents in the network. Our theoretical results hold with-
out requiring speciﬁc assumptions about these behaviors.
In particular, the negative results hold even assuming that
all other agents behave truthfully, and the positive result
holds even for arbitrary behavior of other agents.
We consider a sybil attack to be benecial if as a result of
the manipulation, the attacking agent or one of its sybils is
selected to receive some work when it previously didn’t:
Figure 4: A weakly benecial sybil attack.
Denition 9. (Benecial Sybil Attack) Given ac-
counting mechanism M, subjective work graph Gi, and
choice set Ci such that agent i’s allocation policy picks agent
k ∈ Ci, i.e., A(Gi;Ci) = k, a beneﬁcial (passive or active)
sybil attack j (with at least one sybil s) by agent j ̸= k ∈ Vi
such that Gi↓j = G
′
i and Ci↓j = C
′
i, is one where at least
one of (1), (2), (3), or (4), or combinations thereof holds:
(1) j’s score is increased such that now A(G
′
i;C
′
i) = j.
(2) other agents’ scores are lowered such that A(G
′
i;C
′
i) = j.
(3) sybil s is created with a score such that A(G
′
i;C
′
i) = s.
(4) other agents’ scores are lowered such that A(G
′
i;C
′
i) = s.
How beneﬁcial an attack really is depends on the trade-oﬀ
between the amount of work necessary to perform the attack,
and the resulting amount of “free” work to be consumed:
Denition 10. (Strongly vs. Weakly Benecial Sybil
Attacks) Given accounting mechanism M and work graph
Gi = (Vi;Ei;wi), assume agent j ∈ Vi performs a (passive
or active) sybil attack j such that G
′
i = j(Gi). Let 
n
j de-
note an n−times-repetition of the sybil attack. Let !
−(
n
j )
denote the amount of work involved in performing 
n
j , and
let !
+(
n
j ) denote the amount of work that agent j or any
of its sybils will be able to consume. We call j a:
• strongly benecial sybil attack: if !
+(
n
j ) > 0,
and !
−(
n
j ) = 0 or limn→∞
!+(n
j )
!−(n
j ) = ∞.
• weakly benecial sybil attack: if !
+(
n
j ) > 0 and
!
−(
n
j ) > 0, and ∃c ∈ R≥0 : limn→∞
!+(n
j )
!−(n
j ) ≤ c.
Of course, whether a particular sybil attack is beneﬁcial
or not, depends on the accounting mechanism used. Yet, in
Figures 3 and 4 we give two generic examples. In Figure 3,
agent j has already performed/consumed 10 units of work
for/from agent i, and we assume that i now trusts j’s re-
ports about other agents to some degree. Now, j creates a
set of sybils and falsely reports to i that these sybils have
performed 10 units of work for j. Assuming that this raises
the sybils’ scores high enough (property (3) of Deﬁnition 9),
each sybil can now exploit its score and consume some work
from i. Once the sybils’ scores are “used up”, j can simply
create another sybil and repeat the attack, without perform-
ing new work. Thus, this constitutes a strongly beneﬁcial
(passive) sybil attack.
In Figure 4, we assume that j and k are both inside i’s
choice set. Now, j performs an active sybil attack, creating
sybil sj and letting sj perform some work for i and consume
some work for i. Next, sj makes a false report to i, claiming
that agent k has consumed a lot of work from sj. This may
now decrease agent k’s score enough, such that j is chosen
by the allocation policy the next time j and k compete for(a) (b)
Figure 5: An illustration of single-report-responsiveness: there exists a subjective work graph Gi, e.g., the
one shown in (a), such that a single positive report by j about k, as shown in (b), leads to S
M
ik (Gi;Ci) > S
M
0 .
some of i’s work (property (2) of Deﬁnition 9). However,
consuming work decreases j’s score, which means that after
a certain amount of consumption, i’s allocation policy will
pick k instead of j. Thus, this attack constitutes a weakly
beneﬁcial active sybil attack. Note that in general, passive
and attacks may be weakly or strongly beneﬁcial.
Denition 11. (Sybil-Proofness) An accounting mech-
anism is sybil-proof against strongly (weakly) beneﬁcial sybil
attacks, if for every work graph Gi there exists no passive
or active strongly (weakly) beneﬁcial sybil attack.
We now introduce three natural axioms regarding the de-
sign of accounting mechanisms. First:
Denition 12. (Independence of Disconnected
Agents) Accounting mechanism M satisﬁes independence
of disconnected agents, if for any subjective work graph
Gi = (Vi;Ei;wi) and any choice set Ci, for any k ∈ Vi for
which there does not exist an edge in Ei or for which all
edges in Ei have zero weight, where G
′
i denotes the graph
where node k has been removed, the following holds:
∀j ∈ V
′
i : S
M
ij (Gi;Ci) = S
M
ij (G
′
i;C
′
i)
This axiom requires that the scores do not depend on
disconnected agents, i.e., adding or removing agents with
no amount of work consumed or performed does not change
the scores of other agents.
Denition 13. (Symmetric Accounting Mecha-
nisms) An accounting mechanism M is symmetric if for
any subjective work graph Gi = (Vi;Ei;wi) and choice
set Ci, any graph isomorphism f such that G
′
i = f(Gi),
C
′
i = f(Ci) and f(i) = i:
∀j ∈ Vi \ {i} : S
M
ij (Gi;Ci) = S
M
if(j)(G
′
i;C
′
i):
In words, this axiom requires that a priori, the accounting
mechanism does not put more or less trust into any agent,
i.e., we only consider mechanisms that, for any renaming of
the agents in the network, return the same scores.
1
Our third axiom excludes any“trivial”accounting mecha-
nisms that assign the same or random scores to every agent,
as well as mechanisms that ignore all information except an
agent’s own direct experiences.
1In the context of reputation mechanisms [1], symmetry typ-
ically corresponds to globally consistent, or objective repu-
tation values, where every agent in a network has the same
view on each other agent’s reputation, in contrast to asym-
metric mechanisms that allow for subjective reputation val-
ues. In this terminology, our accounting mechanisms are all
“asymmetric” because they all inherently lead to subjective
scores as they are based on subjective work graphs. How-
ever, what we mean by “symmetry” is something diﬀerent,
namely that from each individual agent’s perspective, other
agents’ scores are invariant to identities.
Denition 14. (Single-Report Responsiveness
Property) An accounting mechanism M has the single-
report responsiveness property if, for any agent i, there
exists a subjective work graph Gi = (Vi;Ei;wi) and
choice set Ci, with nodes j and k such that nodes i
and j are neighbors in Gi and no path connects nodes i
and k, and there exists a graph G
′
i = (V
′
i ;E
′
i;w
′
i) with
V
′
i = Vi, E
′
i = Ei ∪ {(k;j);(j;k)}, and w
′
i(e) = wi(e) for all
e ∈ Ei \ {(k;j);(j;k)}, and there exists a constant c ∈ R>0
with w
′j
i (k;j) = c, such that:
S
M
k (G
′
i;C
′
i) > S
M
0 :
In words, this axiom requires that there exists a work
graph where i has no information about k, and where a
single positive report by agent j about agent k can increase
the score that i assigns to k above the default score (see
Figure 5).
3.1 Impossibility of Sybil-Proofness
Theorem 1. For every accounting mechanism that satis-
es independence of disconnected agents, is symmetric, has
the single-report responsiveness property, and is misreport-
proof, there exists a passive strongly benecial sybil attack.
Proof. Assume that accounting mechanism M satisﬁes
the single-report responsiveness property. Thus, there exists
a graph Gi and nodes i;j and k as described in Deﬁnition
14, for example like the one depicted in Figure 6 (a), and
in particular A(Gi;Ci) ̸= k. Now, let agent j create a sybil
node sj and insert it into Gi such that G
′
i = (V
′
i ;Ei;wi)
with V
′
i = Vi ∪ {sj}. Because of the independence of dis-
connected agents, the scores of all agents in the graph have
remained the same. Note that there is no path connect-
ing k and i as well as no path connecting sj and i, and
thus the two nodes k and sj look the same from i’s per-
spective. Now, assume that agent k performs c units of
work for j (as needed for the single-report responsiveness
property), and by misreport-proofness, agent j is best oﬀ
making a truthful report to i about this interaction, leading
to subjective work graph G
′′
i such that S
M
ik (G
′′
i ;Ci) > S
M
0 .
We assume that S
M
ik (G
′′
i ;Ci) is large enough such that now
A(G
′′
i ;Ci) = k. Because M is symmetric, we can apply a
graph isomorphism f to G
′′
i that only switches the labeling
of sj and k. Thus, there exists a report that j can make
about sj with w
′j
i (sj;j) = c leading to graph G
∗
i such that
S
M
isj(G
∗
i;Ci) > S
M
0 (see Figure 6 (b)). Because of misreport-
proofness, we know that agent j has no disadvantage from
making this report. Thus, property (3) of Deﬁnition 9 is
satisﬁed, and because the attack itself involves no work, this
constitutes a strongly beneﬁcial sybil attack.(a) (b)
Figure 6: An illustration of the strongly benecial sybil attack used in the proof for Theorem 1.
3.2 (Im-)Possibility of K-Sybil-Proofness
In this section we explore whether we can achieve any kind
of formal sybil-proofness guarantees, despite the strong neg-
ative results from the last section. The only property that
we can reasonably relax for the design of useful account-
ing mechanisms is the single-report responsiveness property.
We can conceive of mechanisms that require two, or more
generally, K, positive or negative reports about an agent,
before the mechanism assigns a score distinct from S
M
0 to
that agent. This leads to a generalization of the responsive-
ness property and a corresponding notion of sybil-proofness.
Denition 15. (K-Report Responsiveness Prop-
erty) An accounting mechanism M has the K-report
responsiveness property if, for any agent i, there exists
a subjective work graph Gi = (Vi;Ei;wi) and choice
set Ci, with node l and a set of nodes VK ⊆ Vi with
|VK| = K, such that nodes i and all nodes in VK are
neighbors in Gi and no path is connecting i and l, and
there exists a graph G
′
i = (V
′
i ;E
′
i;w
′
i) with V
′
i = Vi,
E
′
i = Ei ∪ {(k;j);(j;k)|k ∈ VK}, and w
′
i(e) = wi(e) for all
e ∈ Ei \ {(k;j);(j;k)|k ∈ VK}, and there exists a constant
c ∈ R>0 with w
′j
i (k;j) = c for all k ∈ VK, such that:
S
M
ik (G
′
i;C
′
i) > S
M
0 :
Denition 16. (K-Sybil-Proofness) An accounting
mechanism M is K-Sybil-proof against strongly (weakly)
beneﬁcial sybil attacks if, for every work graph Gi, there
exists no passive or active strongly (weakly) beneﬁcial sybil
attack with K or fewer sybils for M.
Theorem 2. For every accounting mechanism that satis-
es independence of disconnected agents, is symmetric, and
has the K-report responsiveness property, there exists an ac-
tive weakly benecial sybil attack.
Proof. Assume that accounting mechanism M is K-
report responsiveness. Then there exists a subjective work
graph Gi and nodes l and VK as described in Deﬁnition
15. If all agents in VK make a report about their edge to
l with weight c leading to G
′
i, then the resulting score for
agent l is greater than S
M
0 ; in particular, we assume that
A(G
′
i;C
′
i) = l. If we remove one agent k
∗ from the set
VK this leads to G
′′
i where S
M
il (G
′′
i ;C
′′
i ) = S
M
0 , and we as-
sume that now A(G
′′
i ;C
′′
i ) ̸= l. Now we let agent j create a
sybil agent sj. Because of the independence of disconnected
agents, this does not change any of the scores. Next, we
assume that sj takes the place of k
∗, performing and con-
suming the same amount of work as k
∗ had such that, from
i’s perspective, agents k
∗ and sj look the same. Because
M is symmetric, if agent sj now makes a report about edge
(l;sj) with weight c, then S
M
il (G
′′′
i ;C
′′′
i ) > S
M
0 . W.l.o.g.
we can assume that l = j. Thus, this constitutes an active
weakly beneﬁcial sybil attack.
We will now show how to turn any reasonable accounting
mechanism into a K-report responsive mechanism that is
K-sybil-proof against strongly beneﬁcial sybil attacks:
Denition 17. (K-Elimination-Wrapper) A K-
Elimination-Wrapper W takes as input an accounting mech-
anism M, a subjective work graph Gi = (Vi;Ei;wi), and
a choice set Ci, and determines the scores S
W
ij (M;Gi;Ci)
for each agent j ∈ Ci, as viewed by agent i. Let P(Vi)
denote the powerset of Vi, and let P≤K(Vi) denote the set
of subsets of P(Vi) of cardinality less than or equal to K.
We let Gi \X denote the subjective work graph that results
from taking Gi and removing all nodes in X from Vi. Then:
S
W
ij (M;Gi;Ci) = min
X∈P≤K(Vi)
{S
M
ij (Gi \ X;Ci \ X)}:
Figure 7: The K-Elimination-Wrapper.
So far, we have not speciﬁed how an accounting mecha-
nism uses a subjective work graph to compute the scores, in
particular, how indirect reports from other agents are used.
The design of accounting mechanisms is based on the notion
of transitive trust, i.e., if A trusts B and B trusts C, then A
also trusts C to some degree. Furthermore, we assume that
the only way to earn trust is by performing work. To ob-
tain a mechanism that is sybil-proof against certain attacks,
we assume that an agent’s maximum inﬂuence on another
agent’s score is bounded. We let work(j) denote the total
amount of work that agent j has performed in the network.
Here, j represents any attacking agent which can be a real
agent or a sybil node:
Denition 18. (Work-monotonic Transitive Trust
Property) An accounting mechanism M has the work-
monotonic transitive trust property, if for any subjective
work graph Gi and choice set Ci with j ∈ Vi and k ̸= j ∈ Ci,
and any misreport attack j such that G
′
i = Gi↓j:
|S
M
ik (Gi;Ci) − S
M
ik (G
′
i;Ci)| ≤ f(work(j)) ∈ R+ \ {∞}
and f(0) = 0 and f(·) is weakly monotonically increasing.
In words, this assumes that the maximum diﬀerence in
agent k’s scores that j can cause via a misreport is bounded
by a ﬁnite function that weakly monotonically increases in
the amount of work performed by j and that is zero when
work(j) = 0.Theorem 3. A K-elimination-wrapper applied to an ac-
counting mechanism that satises the work-monotonic tran-
sitive trust property leads to an accounting mechanism that
is K-sybil-proof against strongly benecial passive or active
sybil attacks.
Proof. Assume there exists a sybil attack by some agent
j that involve less than or equal to K sybils and is strongly
beneﬁcial. The K-elimination wrapper iteratively removes
all subsets of agents of size K or less from Gi, computes all
scores without those subsets, and ultimately takes the min-
imum. Thus, in one of those iterations, all of j’s sybils will
be removed from Gi, and the resulting score will be part of
the overall minimization of the wrapper. Thus, if an agent’s
score before the sybil attack was lower than afterwards, then
the wrapper will take the score from before the attack. This
excludes options (1) and (3) from the set of beneﬁcial sybil
attacks (see Deﬁnition 9) where the goal of the sybil attack
was to increase agent j’s or one of the sybils’ scores. This
only leaves options (2) and (4). Consider ﬁrst option (2),
where the other agents’ scores are lowered enough such that
afterwards j is allocated. If j is allocated, j is inside the
choice set and thus the attack must have been performed by
one of j’s sybils, let it be s. Because the mechanism satisﬁes
the work-monotonic transitive trust property, we know that
to decrease an agent’s score, s must have performed work
before. Furthermore, the amount of decrease is limited by
f(work(s)). Now, if the attack is successful, then j gets to
consume some units of work “for free”. However, after con-
suming a certain amount of work, j’s score is lowered again,
and at some point, j’s score will be lower than k’s score
again. Thus, now another sybil attack would be necessary,
which again would require the sybil agents to perform work.
Thus, the amount of free work resulting from this sybil at-
tack is bounded: for every x units of “free” work, the sybil
attack requires a certain ﬁxed amount of work as well. The
argument is analogous for option (4). Thus, the sybil attack
can be weakly beneﬁcial, but not strongly beneﬁcial.
4. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
We now discuss some practical aspects related to the the-
oretical ﬁndings from the previous section.
K-Sybil-Proofness in Practice.
Note that using the K-elimination-wrapper does not pro-
vide robustness against weakly beneﬁcial sybil attacks. Fur-
thermore, even achieving K-sybil-proofness against strongly
beneﬁcial sybil attacks comes at a cost: the resulting mech-
anism is only K-report-responsive and ignores a larger part
of the available information compared to a single-report re-
sponsive mechanism. Assuming random interactions be-
tween peers, the probability of having K reports about an
agent decreases exponentially in K. Thus, real-world sys-
tem designers face an important trade-oﬀ between (limited)
robustness against sybil attacks on the one side, and infor-
mativeness on the other side. In some domains, creating
one or two sybils may be relatively cheap, but creating more
sybils could become very expensive. For example, you might
have one home IP address and one work IP address that you
control, and obtaining a third IP address might be reason-
ably costly. Thus, for this particular domain, a 2-sybil-proof
mechanism might provide useful robustness.
In some domains the interactions between peers are not
random, e.g., in P2P ﬁle sharing communities where agents
may have similar taste preferences. In these highly clustered
domains, it might be reasonable to assume that each agent
has an average of more than K reports about each other
agent, such that after applying a K-elimination-wrapper,
the resulting scores would still be informative enough. In
future work, we will analyze this trade-oﬀ in more detail.
Max-Flow: Robustness to Sybil Attacks.
We have seen that fully sybil-proof accounting mechanisms
do not exist, and even limited robustness comes at a high
price. One way to address this problem in practice is the
application of the max-ﬂow algorithm inside an account-
ing mechanism. In Seuken et al. [11], we present mecha-
nisms that compute agent j’s score from i’s perspective as
MF(j;i)−MF(i;j), where MF(x;y) denotes the maximum
ﬂow on agent i’s subjective work graph. While this does
not provide any formal guarantees against sybil attacks, us-
ing max-ﬂow provides additional robustness in practice: it
bounds the inﬂuence of any agent by the total amount of
work performed by that agent itself, which is a special form
of the work-monotonic transitive trust property. This limits
the power of sybil attacks, making them more costly and
thus less attractive for the attacking agent. By the same ar-
gument, max-ﬂow is also useful to protect against Byzantine
agents, i.e., agents that try to harm the network or speciﬁc
agents in the network. For example, if a Byzantine agent
reports that agent i has consumed 1,000,000 units of work
from him, and if other agents believe this report, then agent
i will be unable to receive any work from those agents in the
future. Using max-ﬂow makes Byzantine attacks more dif-
ﬁcult and costly for the attacking agent, thereby providing
signiﬁcant robustness against such attacks in practice.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the (non-)existence of sybil-
proof accounting mechanisms. Our main result is that under
reasonable assumptions, no sybil-proof accounting mecha-
nism exists. This is a strong impossibility result, answering
an important open question. This result is also in stark con-
trast to well-known positive results regarding sybil-proofness
reputation mechanisms. We have explored a signiﬁcantly
weaker notion of sybil-proofness, where we have shown that
by using a K-elimination wrapper, we can design accounting
mechanisms that are K-sybil-proof against strongly beneﬁ-
cial sybil manipulations. However, these mechanisms are
still susceptible to weakly beneﬁcial attacks. It is notewor-
thy that all of our results hold independent of the behavior
of other agents in the network. Finally, we have illustrated
the beneﬁts of using max-ﬂow algorithms for the internal
score computation. While this does not provide formal sybil-
proofness guarantees, it limits the inﬂuence of any particular
agent, thereby providing some robustness against sybil ma-
nipulations and Byzantine attacks in practice. We hope that
this work will inform others about the general limitations of
the design of accounting mechanisms for distributed work
systems and encourage new pragmatic analyses.
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